general principles created difficulties, for the honour code was not a set of carefully defined regulations. Further, the honour code was often at odds with the law, the Articles of War. Indeed, just as there was often no simple and honourable road to follow, military officers sometimes had to choose between the code and the law.
The best surviving evidence of the dilemmas faced by military officers in interpreting the honour code, especially with reference to the prevailing legal regulations, is the Court Martial Records.2 In particular, we can best understand the problems presented by the honour code by studying that classic 'honour' crime, 'conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman'.
Conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman was not defined in the Articles of War. By keeping it vague and indefinite, the charge remained flexible enough to change as ideas of honour changed. Equally important, such an indefinitely stated rule could be used as a device for disciplining officers for behaviour which was not criminal or even 'dishonourable', but which offended the officers of a particular regiment. In 1778, for example, the relevant Article of War simply read, 'Whatsoever commissioned Officer shall be convicted before a general Court Martial of behaving in a scandalous infamous manner, such as is unbecoming the character of an officer and a gentleman, shall be discharged from our service.'3 Around 1789 a clause was added which provided 'that in every charge preferred against an officer for such scandalous or unbecoming behaviour, the facts or fact wherein the same is grounded, shall be clearly specified'. ' Long before this clause was formally enshrined in the Articles of War, there was tension between some members of the military who were happy with this undefined crime and the Judge Advocate General who wanted a more precise definition. It was possible for a man to be charged with conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman without being presented with any specific complaint until he faced the prosecutor in Court. Needless to say, this made it difficult to prepare a proper defence. The Colin Campbell case illustrates this problem very well. Campbell was accused of unbecoming conduct in 1759 after a quarrel with a Lieutenant Monro. His principal prosecutor was his commanding officer, Brigadier Bryan Crump, who tried to introduce evidence of Campbell's shortcomings by reference to other incidents that had occurred since Campbell had joined the regiment.5 The Court Martial refused to accept this testimony 2 In preparing this article I have examined The Court Martial Records (Series W.O. 71) with special emphasis on Courts Martials for 'conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman' between 1755 and 1775. It is safe to assume that most disputes involving the honour code and the law were settled out of court but that they were similar in nature to those discussed below. In the larger sense, it was impossible to resolve the dilemma created by this particular offence because Courts Martial in the eighteenth century were not only courts of law but courts of honour, and these two functions were not the same.10 As we have noted, honour, by definition, is vague, imprecise and ever changing. Felonies, by way of contrast, are reasonably precise and constant. Alexander Tytler grasped the problem which the military faced in this area when he wrote:
Rules and Articles for the Better Govermnent of His
But there are offences which admit of no precise definition, and yet which in the military profession are of the most serious consequence, as weakening and subverting that principle of honour on which the proper discipline of the army must materially depend. Of these a Court-Martial, which is in the highest sense a Court of Honour, are themselves appointed the sole judges, or rather the legislators: for it in their breasts to define the crime as well as to award punishment. " To understand how the Court Martial trial functioned in honour cases and to illuminate the tension that existed between the honour code and the law, it is necessary to examine the major non-legal method of resolving disputes, the duel. Officially, duelling was forbidden in the eighteenth century by the Articles of War. The reasons why are obvious: constant duelling to settle private disputes among officers hurt the regiments -good officers could be lost in this fashion; it set a bad example for the men in the ranks; and it was the most glaring example of disharmony and disunity among the officers of the regiment, an organization which was supposed to be characterized by unity and brotherhood. In order to protect men who were challenged to duels and refused to fight the Articles stated, Nor shall any officer or soldier upbraid another for refusing a challenge, since according to these our orders, they do but the duty of soldiers, who ought to subject themselves to discipline; and we do acquit and discharge all men who have quarrels offered, or challenges sent to them, of all disgrace, or opinion of disadvantage in their obedience hereunto; and whosoever shall upbraid them, or offend in this case, shall be punished as a challenger.21 18 It was one thing for the king to make pronouncements of this sort and quite another to put them into practice when the honour code dictated entirely different behaviour. Military officers might try to the best of their ability to encourage the peaceful settlement of disputes, but the officer who refused a challenge was subject to peer group ostracism that made the approbation of the king small consolation indeed.22
The difficulty faced by an officer caught between the Articles of War and the honour code is revealed in David Scott's writings on Courts Martial. While paying his respects to the proscription against duelling, Scott goes on to note, ...with all the denunciations against 'the challenger' before his eyes, the officer who should permit the use of opprobrious expressions towards him, much less a blow, or indeed any conduct from another that should degrade him, or in the smallest degree impeach his courage, would be liable to be arraigned before a Court Martial for conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman; and at the least to a council of inquiry of his brother officers... whose decision could not amount to less than the resignation of his commission.23
Further, Scott declared that 'notwithstanding the explicit declarations of the written law, the custom of the service would seem to demand a reference to arms...' and he proceeded to describe in great detail the procedures to be followed by principals and seconds in duels as prescribed by military custom.24
The In some cases of character aspersion, the court simply found both men guilty and each had to make a public apology as a result. In the Dalrymple and Gaskell case, each accused the other of resembling a particular dog, and a dispute ensued over which of the officers was the handsomer and which could write better English. Dalrymple drew his sword on Gaskell in the midst of the quarrel, and for this he received a public reprimand on the Grand Parade and was forced to ask Gaskell's pardon. Gaskell was found guilty of character aspersion and was forced to ask Dalrymple's pardon, too.37
By eighteenth-century standards, unkind remarks about an entire unit were quite as serious an offence as aspersion of the character of a fellow officer. These cases could be as complicated as those involving slights to individuals. The eighteenth-century army officer was caught between two conflicting modes of behaviour. To some extent he was torn between the past and the future. Personal defence of one's honour was giving way to the more dispassionate, and less bloody, legal resolution of disputes, but the relationship between the two was unclear.49 For this reason, while conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman may not have been a crime by most legal standards of the day, it was essential to keep it on the books; without it there would have been no legal method of settling disputes of this nature when attempts at mediation failed. In an honour-conscious society where duelling had been the final solution to irreconcilable conflicts, the 'honour crime' was essential if the transition was going to be made from blood-letting to judicial decision, if legal confrontation was to Boards who had to pay heed to generally accepted legal practices in both military and civil law. Personal animosity would be minimized, and the officer charged would have the benefit of a public forum at which he could make his case. Further, the findings of the Court Martial would be subject to outside review by commanding officers, governors, the Judge Advocate General, and, in some cases, the king. This gave the officer far more protection than if the settlement of disputes had been left to the subalterns -or the duel. In other words, the Court Martial could serve as a duelling substitute and play a role in settling disputes which might otherwise have ended in the death of one of the disputants. Conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman served another function as well. The threat of legal action with its attendant publicity probably helped to pressure officers into settling their disputes privately. It is likely that the subaltern officers worked to resolve these conflicts more equitably because of the knowledge that an ostracized officer might call for a Court Martial hearing to clear his name. It may be true that 'conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman' was inadequately defined from a legal point of view, but the charge see-ms to have been a necessary evil in the eighteenth-century army.
